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STRANGE SUBORDINATIONS:




The closer reading of a familiar rule often reveals numerous
surprises. As I reached the subordination issues during my work on
the next edition of Blumberg on Corporate Groups, the statutory
provision regarding subordination of claims from the purchase of
securities seemed to have more texture than it initially revealed,
justifying a closer look. I never expected that each closer look into
the operation of § 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code would reveal one
more peculiarity.
This Article begins with the paradoxical treatment of claims in
the context of corporate groups. The paradox surfaces when
comparing the inconsistent treatment of fraud claims in two
transactions that have the same effect. Consider the two following
transactions.
Sale of Stock: Parent, Inc. owns 100% of Sub, Inc. Parent sells all
the common stock of Sub to Buyer, Inc. at an inflated price because
of a misrepresentation. Buyer files a fraud action against Parent.
Parent files for bankruptcy and invokes § 510(b), which states that
"a claim.., for damages arising ... from the purchase of [a security
of an affiliate of the debtor] ... shall be subordinated." ' Accord-
* Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law. Ptyhio Nomikis (J.D.), Athens
University, Greece. L.L.M., SJ.D. in Economic Analysis of Law, Harvard Law School.
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11 U.S.C. § 510(b) (1994). The full text of § 510 (b) subordinates several types of
claims arising from a purchase. All types of subordinated claims are included in the
references to "fraud claims" by this Article. Section 510(b) reads as follows:
For the purpose of distribution under this title, a claim arising from rescission of a
purchase or sale of a security of the debtor or of an affiliate of the debtor, for
damages arising from the purchase or sale of such a security, or for reimbursement
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ingly, if a parent corporation sells stock of a subsidiary, a plain
reading of § 510(b) leads to subordination of any claims arising
from the sale By comparison, consider the outcome when the sale
of control is recast as a sale of assets.
Sale of Assets: Parent, Inc. causes a sale of all the assets of its
wholly-owned subsidiary, Sub, Inc., to Buyer, Inc. The price Buyer
pays is inflated because of a misrepresentation. Buyer brings a
contract claim and a deceit claim against Sub, the seller of the
assets. If Sub attempts to become judgment-proof by distributing
the proceeds to the Parent as a dividend, it would be violating
fraudulent transfer law and other creditor safeguards." The
priorities to the proceeds would be as follows: (1) creditors of Sub
(including Buyer), (2) preferred shareholders of Sub, (3) creditors
of Parent secured by Sub's stock, (4) unsecured creditors, (5)
preferred shareholders of Parent, and (6) the common
shareholders of Parent.4
or contribution allowed under section 502 on account of such a claim, shall be
subordinated to all claims or interests that are senior to or equal the claim or
interest represented by such security, except that if such security is common stock,
such claim has the same priority as common stock.
Id. The definition of "affiliate" is in § 101 (2). Affiliates include parent entities as well as
subsidiaries. Id. § 101(2). In the case of both parent and subsidiaries, neither majority
ownership nor de facto control are necessary. The Code uses a mechanical ownership
threshold of 20% to define affiliation. Id
2 Only two reported cases dealt with § 510(b) in the context of subordination of claims
from the purchase of affiliates' common stock. Both applied it as written and subordinated
the claims of the defrauded buyers to the parents' general creditors. SeeJenkins v. Tomlinson
(In re Basin Resources Corp.), 190 B.R. 824 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996) (holding that claims of
investors in oil exploration ventures against the organizer and parent of all ventures are
subordinated to the general creditors of the parent); CLC of America, Inc. v. Lake Shore
Equip. Distrs., Inc. (In re Wisconsin Barge Line, Inc.), 76 B.R. 142 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1987)
(providing that claims of defrauded buyer of 100% of debtor's subsidiaries are subordinated
to general creditors of the debtor).
' See, e.g., UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AGT §§ 4-5 (1994); REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP.
AcT §§ 6.40, 8.33 (1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 160, 173-74 (1998). All these provisions
prohibit distributions that would render a corporation insolvenL
' When the preferred shareholders of Sub are satisfied, the remaining value is
distributed to its shareholder ParenL If Parent has used this stock as collateral, however, the
secured creditor would have priority in the liquidating dividend (which, as proceeds, would
fall under U.C.C. § 9-306). After satisfaction of any secured creditors, the Parent's
shareholders would still not be able to distribute the proceeds to themselves unless Parent's
ordinary creditors and preferred shareholders were not jeopardized by this distribution (or,
in case of a liquidation, unless they were satisfied). See supra note 3. Fraudulent transfer law
and corporate law impose protection of creditors in continuing enterprises. See infra note 32
and accompanying texL
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In the second example (sale of assets), the Buyer's claim has
priority over claims of creditors of the Parent. By comparison, the
effect of § 510(b) in a sale of stock is equivalent to a multiple
subordination. The Buyer's claim loses its seniority vis-a-vis the
preferred Sub stock and Parent creditors, is subordinated below the
claims of the preferred Parent's stockholders, and, finally, is placed
on equal footing with the claims of the Parent shareholders.
This Article argues that a literal reading of § 510(b) leads to
four wrong results. Part II briefly discusses the history of the
subordination of shareholders' fraud and rescission claims. Part III
discusses the effect of § 510(b) on fraud deterrence during solvency.
Furthermore, two errors that result from a literal application of the
statute are discussed. The text of § 510(b) requires subordination
to a level equal to common stock. This command, which is ignored
by the courts, would have eroded the deterrence against fraud. The
second error of a literal reading, which again is latent, regards the
unjustified use of the "purchase or sale" language. Claims from
(re)sales of securities to the issuing debtor should not be
subordinated because they neither correspond to transactions in
which the higher risks of securities with low priority are assumed by
the defrauded sellers nor do they offer an easy venue for abuse of
securities fraud litigation. Part IV engages the effect of § 510(b) on
fraud deterrence during insolvency, but outside of bankruptcy.
Section 510(b) eliminates deterrence and effectively creates an
incentive to defraud buyers of securities other than common stock
and buyers of common stock of subsidiaries. The courts have not
yet corrected these two errors. Part V examines the avenues for
repairing § 510(b) and proposes an interpretation that could
remedy the major errors of the section more efficiently than an
unlikely legislative correction. Part VI concludes by reviewing the
spectrum of errors and remedies that the Article discusses.
II. SUBORDINATION OF SHAREHOLDERS' FRAUD AND RESCISSION
CLAIMS IN AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The general provision of § 510(b)-that shareholders' claims
should be subordinate to creditors' claims-came with the adoption
' A legislative correction of§ 510(b) is unlikely because previous efforts to correct one
of the errors discussed here were fruitless, perhaps because of the cohesion of the creditors'
interest group that the corrections threaten. See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
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of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978. However, the past discussion
concerning the proper priority of shareholders' fraud and rescission
claims never focused on the claims of subsidiary shareholders or on
the claims by holders of securities other than common stock.
Subordination of fraud claims was not the setting under which the
issue was first litigated. In the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, defrauded shareholders attempted to rescind the
purchases of their stock either under common law or under the
"blue sky" state securities laws. In these cases, some shareholder
claims were protected by a common-law constructive trust that gave
them priority over creditors, some were granted creditor seniority,
and others were subordinated.' Thus, during that time, case law
proceeded on a case-by-case basis, with a resistance toward
subordinating the claims of innocent passive investors. However, in
1973, Professors John Slain and Homer Kripke published an article
supporting the subordination of shareholders' fraud and recission
claims based in part upon a reliance-like argument that
shareholders' and creditors' expectations require subordination.7
In lack of noticeable opposition, Congress adopted the Slain and
Kripke position with the enactment of the 1978 Code, a position
6 Priority through a constructive trust was hindered in practice by the requirement of
tracing the res of the trust. Cases giving defrauded security buyers constructive trust
protection surfaced even after the adoption of the Code. See, e.g., Drexel Burnham Lambert,
Inc. v. Flight Transp. Corp. (In re Flight Transp. Corp.), 730 F.2d 1128, 1137-38 (8th Cir.
1984) (constructive trust argument partially prevails over § 510). John J. Slain and Homer
Kripke, in their article, The Interface Between Securities Regulation and Bankruptcy-Allocating the
Risk of Illegal Securities Issuance Between Securityholders and the Issuer's Creditors, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV.
261 (1973), point to In reRhine, 241 F. Supp. 86 (D. Colo. 1965), which granted constructive
trust protection to quasi-equity investors in an unincorporated debtor. Creditor seniority was
given to shareholder rescission claims in many cases, but depending on the theory that the
court adopted, the) might be subordinated to creditors who advanced credit after the equity
investment with the idea that the credit was given in reliance on the existence of an equity
cushion. See generally Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., The Status of Defrauded Securityholders in Corporate
Bankruptcy, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1, 4-8. In Oppenheimer v. Harriman National Bank and Trust Co., the
court allowed a defrauded shareholder's claim to share at the same rank with creditor claims.
301 U.S. 206 (19371. However, the case cannot be read to conclude that shareholder claims
must always be given creditor seniority. That the Supreme Court had no animus against
subordination might be supported by the fact that it took no argument with the subordination
of shareholder claims as recently as 1968 in Protective Committee for Independent Stockholders of
TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414,453 (1968).
See Slain & Kripke, supra note 6.
' See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, § 502 (codified
at 11 U.S.C. § 502).
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that had in the interim also been adopted by some courts.9 The
dearth of litigation on this issue in the thirty years before the
passage of the Code made the legal landscape appear unusually
conducive to this new arrangement regarding the treatment of
fraud and recission claims."0
The thrust of Slain and Kripke's argument is founded on the
bargain and reliance interests formed by creditors and equityhold-
ers. When equityholders claim damages due to fraud in the
issuance of their securities, they convert all or part of their equity
claim into a debt claim. Unless their fraud claims are subordinated,
equity holders obtain the same level of seniority as creditors.
Allowing equityholders to become creditors gives them the best of
both worlds: a claim to the upside and participation with creditors
in the downside. If the firm performs well, the increase in its value
benefits shareholders exclusively. If the firm falls, shareholders
exercise their fraud claims and receive a portion of the value of the
failed firm, sharing with the creditors. Creditors, on the other
hand, rely on the capital contributed by shareholders for the
satisfaction of their claims. Allowing rescission claims to share the
same priority as debt eliminates this safety cushion.
The fast expansion of securities fraud liability during the
decade immediately preceding the appearance of the Slain and
Kripke article did nothing to allay fears that, without subordination,
shareholders could threaten creditors' expectations. To the
contrary, the expansive securities fraud liability was the impetus for
Slain and Kripke's subordination arguments. Their explicit
argument was conclusoy: that creditors should not bear the risk of
securities fraud by their lender." Implicitly, the reader ought to
understand that if the opposing position was adopted (i.e., if
After the Slain and Kripke article, but before the passage of the Code, the following
three decisions employed Slain and Kripke's position of subordinating fraud claims of
innocent shareholders that had not enjoyed corporate assets as either securityholders or
employees: Aldrich v. Redington (In reWeis Securities, Inc.), 605 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1128 (1979);Jezariah v. Raichle (In re Stirling Homex Corp.), 579 F.2d 206
(2d Cir. 1978), cer. denied, 439 U.S. 1074 (1979); and Thompson v. Tulchin (In re Cartridge
Television, Inc.), 535 F.2d 1388 (2d Cir. 1976). After the passage of the Code, the new rule
was applied to pre-Code cases by Kira v. Holiday Mart, Inc. (In re Holiday Mart, Inc.), 715 F.2d
430 (1983); In re THO Fin. Corp., 679 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1982); Kelce v. United States Fin.,
Inc., 648 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1980).
" I will use "fraud claims" and "fraud creditors" hereinafter to refer to fraud, rescission,
and other claims arising from the purchase of securities.
" See Slain & Kripke, supra note 6, at 298.
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creditors were ultimately liable for fraudulent behavior by corporate
debtors via unsubordinated fraud claims), then creditors would
theoretically monitor corporate debtors in order to prevent
securities fraud. Underlying Slain and Kripke's conclusory
assertion, then, are the arguments that securities fraud liability
provides sufficient deterrence and that the additional monitoring by
the creditors is unnecessary.
Subsequent to the adoption of the Code, a critique of Slain and
Kripke reveals the purely redistributive nature of subordination."
The critique can be expanded convincingly. Depending on the rule
(subordination or not), creditors will adjust their expectations
about the value of their claims against firms even before the firms
financially fail. If subordination was repealed, existing debt would
lose value and existing equity would gain value. In essence,
therefore, the reliance interests and the "best-of-both-worlds"
concerns are denominated in the value of the different securities. If
the value (and the productivity on which value depends) of firms
does not change depending on the rule, a change in the rule
cannot be justified because it simply reshuffles firm value between
creditors and equityholders.
The productivity (and value) of firms would change if the risk
of securities fraud depended on whether fraud claims were
subordinated. Thus, the question returns to the adequacy of
deterrence that securities fraud liability provides. Suppose that
lenders are in an excellent position to prevent securities fraud by
borrowers. Nevertheless, lenders would not have the incentive to
prevent the fraud if they were unaffected by the securities fraud that
their borrowers committed. A rule that motivates lenders to
monitor corporate borrowers, such as not subordinating securities
fraud claims, would then be desirable because it would reduce
securities fraud and increase the total value of firms. However,
there is little reason to believe that securities fraud liability
underdeters issuers or that lenders are in a better position to
prevent it.13
12 See Davis, supra note 6, at 34-36.
By contrast, the nonsubordination of shareholder claims may entice creditors to
conceal securities fraud. See id. at 50. If, for example, the basis for securities fraud liability is
that a senior executive borrows funds surreptitiously from the corporation, creditors who fear
that securities fraud liability will erode their claims may prefer to ignore the transactions to
the misappropriator's benefit. Consider the example of a corporation that has $15 million in
assets remaining after the insider has "borrowed" significant funds. Because the insider
[Vol. 16
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Effectively, the paucity of subordination litigation preceding
the adoption of the Code in 1978 allowed Congress to write on an
essentially blank slate. Once the rule has been set, changing it
without exceedingly strong proof is unjustified. Therefore, this
Article does not engage the question of subordination generally. 4
But, the lack of litigation regarding the errors that this Article
identifies indicates that expectations underlying subordination
should still be fluid, and that the correction of § 510(b) is easily
justified. Moreover, the history of the adoption of § 510(b) shows
that the language extending subordination to the claims of the
subsidiaries' shareholders and subordinating the claims of each class
of creditors to a level junior to each class's claims was an oversight.
The House Report regarding the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 never mentions the subordination of subsidiary shareholder
claims. As for the subordination of fraud claims by claimants other
than common stockholders, it states that:
[T]he bill subordinates in priority of distribution [fraud and]
rescission claims to all claims that are senior to the claim.., on which
the [fraud or] rescission claims are based. Thus, a [fraud or]
rescission claim resulting from the purchase of a subordinated
debenture would share in the proceeds of the estate before equityS 15
security holders but after general unsecured creditors.
The Senate Report does include, probably reflexively, the "or of
an affiliate" language. "The subsection also requires the court to
subordinate in payment any claim.., arising from the purchase or
sale of a security of the debtor or of an affiliate.., to all claims and
"borrowing" was not disclosed, shareholders can create a $5 million securities fraud liability.
If stockholders share in creditor recoveries without being subordinated, creditors will weigh
the amount that can be recovered from the insider against the prospect of $5 million more of
claims sharing in the assets. If the corporation will recover $1 million and creditors are owed
$20 million in total, creditors will compare receiving 100% of $15 million to 20/25 of $16
million, or $12.8 million, and will prefer to sweep the insider loan under the proverbial rug.
Nevertheless, Davis proceeds to argue that creditors are the least-cost-avoiders of
securities fraud because they, unlike public shareholders, can bargain for access to the
corporate records and, thus, prevent fraud if fear of securities fraud liability gave them the
incentive. See id. Of course, Davis does not take his thesis to its conclusion, which is that for
the creditors to have full monitoring incentives, shareholder fraud claims must be senior to
creditor claims.
', For a briefjustification of this position see infra note 40 and accompanying text.




interests that are senior to the claim.., represented by the
security."" The Senate Report copies almost verbatim the Code's
language, including the use of "purchase or sale" and "debtor or
affiliate," which is problematic." The report does not mention that
fraud claims are subordinated not only to senior claims but also to
the claims of the same class of creditors.
An error was inferred from the inaccuracy of the House and
Senate Reports with respect to the subordination of fraud claims by
classes other than common stock. Since the reports described
subordination only with respect to claims of senior classes, the
subordination to claims of the same class may have been
inadvertent. Accordingly, at least twice an attempt was made to pass
a corrective amendment restoring same-class fraud claims to equal
priority with the class.18 No corrective attempt has succeeded.
Given the failure of the attempts to correct the aforementioned
error of § 510(b), one could speculate about the likelihood that
Congress would correct other similar errors. Accepting that
blocking legislation is easier for interest groups than instituting it,
and supposing that the correction was blocked by creditor interest
groups, might lead one to the conclusion that any other error in
§ 510(b) could also be perpetuated if it favors creditors. The errors
emphasized in this Article are indeed to the advantage of creditors
of the parent because the errors cause other claimants' fraud claims
to be excessively subordinated. It is important to keep in mind the
odds of legislative correction when considering, as this Article
suggests, the alternative remedy of correction through judicial
interpretation.
Having reviewed the context in which § 510(b) was adopted
and left uncorrected, this Article next turns to the errors of
§ 510(b). All four errors erode the deterrence of fraud, but they are
placed in two categories. Part III engages the reduced deterrence
, S. REP. No. 95-989, at 74 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CAN. 5787,5860.
The use of "purchase or sale" causes the problematic subordination of fraud claims in
cases of repurchases by the corporation of its securities. See infra Part III.B. and text
accompanying notes 22-24. The use of "debtor or affiliate" causes the problematic
subordination of fraud claims against parents for sale of their subsidiaries' stock. See infra Part
W.B. and text accompanying notes 29-39.
" See S. 658, 96th Cong. (1980); Staff of Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess., Amendment to S.658 (Committee Print No. 2, 1981); see also Daniel C. Cohn,
Subordinated Claims: Their Classification and Voting Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 56 AM.
BANKR. LJ. 293, 300 n.33 (1982).
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that adhering to the letter of § 510 (b) would have produced outside
of bankruptcy if the courts did not ignore its language. Part IV
discusses the much more severe problems § 510(b) creates during
insolvency, when it furnishes incentives for defrauding security
purchasers that have yet to be corrected by the courts.
III. FRAUD INCENTIVES DURING SOLVENCY
Although insolvency clearly erodes the deterrence that the tort
system provides, we generally expect the tort system to have its full
deterring impact during solvency. The system achieves deterrence
only if the tort victims' claims have clear seniority to the claims of
the decisionmakers. Thus, corporate management acts on the
shareholders' behalf during solvency, and, in the event of
dissolution, shareholders claim the residual value after all creditors
are paid, including tort victims.
Section 510(b) breaks this smooth surface with two paradoxical
subordinations. It erodes the deterrence against defrauding
shareholders by reducing the shareholders' claims, and it erodes the
deterrence against defrauding shareholders who sell their shares
back to the firm by also subordinating and reducing their claims.
A. Reduced Deterrence against Defrauding New Shareholders
Section 510(b) reduces the seniority of claims arising from the
purchase of common stock to a seniority equal to that of other
common shareholders.19 The problem regarding deterrence arises
because the fraud claims of common stockholders have the same
seniority as common stock. Before studying the deterrence that this
type of subordination induces, an examination of its exact
consequences is required.
When a liquidated claim has the same seniority as an
unliquidated claim and a liquidation occurs in which there are
insufficient funds to pay all claims of a certain class, the
claimholders will share ratably in the available funds, each receiving
the same number of cents on the dollar. If, however, we try to apply
this concept to the command of § 510(b)-that claims arising from
the purchase of common stock are subordinated to equal seniority
" 11 U.S.C. § 510(b) (1994) ("such claim has the same priority as common stock").
, A liquidated claim is one that has been reduced to a specific monetary amount.
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with common stock claims-we run into the problem that the claims
of the common shareholders are not liquidated, but instead they are
claims to the residual value.
Two possible approaches could remedy the problem. One
implies ignoring the command of equality and giving supremacy to
the idea that the common stockholders have a claim to the residual
value. Accordingly, the subordinated fraud claim is paid first in its
entirety before the residual goes to the shareholders. But if one
tries to implement the equal seniority of§ 510(b), the first step must
be to reduce the shareholders' claims for the residual to a
liquidated amount, without making provision for the subordinated
claim. Then, following liquidation of the shareholder claims, the
subordinated claim is added and the sum is ratably satisfied by the
residual value. An example will clarify.
Ratable Satisfaction of Liquidated Equity Claims. Incorporated, Co.
is in liquidation and has a $10 million securities fraud claim against
it, arising from the issuance of common stock. After all other claims
are satisfied, equity of $30 million remains for distribution to the
shareholders and the securities fraud claimants. This $30 million
becomes the liquidated claim of common stockholders. Then, $40
million of claims have the priority of common stock. These claims
run against $30 million of assets, implying a pro rata distribution of
seventy-five cents on the dollar. The fraud claimants receive $7.5
million.
In practice, the "equal seniority" of § 510(b) is without
hesitation interpreted as "immediately senior to common stock.""
Fraud claims receive priority contrary to the language of § 510(b).
A simple exercise shows that if the courts were to follow the
"equal seniority" command, the ratable subordination it implies
would undercompensate the fraud victims and fail to bring them to
the position they would have enjoyed had the fraud never occurred,
thus reducing the deterrence that fraud liability should provide.
Mitigation of Claim through Ratable Satisfaction. Again, imagine
that Incorporated, Co. has managed to defraud a group of
shareholders holding fifty percent of Incorporated common stock
by persuading them to overpay by $10 million. After liquidation,
the residual assets available for the equityholders are $30 million.
2 See, e.g., In re Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 140 B.R. 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (providing
that a reorganization plan that places rescission claims senior to equity is approved without
discussion of the issue).
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According to the previous example, ratable distribution implies
seventy-five cents on the dollar, or $7.5 million for the subordinated
claim and $11.25 million for fifty percent of the equity claim,
totaling $18.75 million for the defrauded shareholders.
Note that if Incorporated had not induced the fraudulent
contribution, then only $20 million in residual assets would be
available for distribution to the shareholders. Those shareholders
holding fifty percent of Incorporated common stock previously
assumed to have been defrauded would receive $10 million at the
end of liquidation.
Consider, finally, that Incorporated did induce the fraudulent
contribution, thus leaving $30 million after payment to other
creditors, and the claims of the defrauded shareholders receive
priority. Then, the shareholders holding fifty percent of
Incorporated common stock would receive $10 million in
satisfaction of their fraud claims and $10 million as part of the
residual distribution following liquidation, for a total of $20 million.
Thus, by giving priority to the claim for fraud the defrauded
shareholders receive $1.25 million more than if the fraud claim had
been satisfied ratably.
Thus, the against-the-text application that § 510(b) enjoys is
desirable because it produces as much deterrence as when the
corporation is solvent. One more wrinkle of § 510(b) as applied to
solvent firms must be addressed before we can proceed to its
consequences during insolvency.
B. Reduced Deterrence against Defrauding Shareholders who (Re)Sell their
Stock to the Corporate Debtor
The phrasing of § 510(b) is evidence of the infectious nature of
statutory composition. In a vast number of other instances the law
treats purchases and sales similarly.22 However, no reason justifies
the similar treatment of purchases and sales in the context of
subordination of claims arising from security transactions.
Nevertheless, § 510(b) is infected and includes the language that
equalizes the treatment of purchases and sales.
The "purchases or sales" language of § 510(b) improperly
applies to repurchases by the corporation of its own stock. Sellers'
" A Lexis search of all codes (library CODES, file ALLCDE) for the phrase "PURCHASE
OR SALE" produces 5,024 hits.
1999]
BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTSJOURNAL
claims of fraudulent activity in connection with stock repurchases
are subordinated under § 510 (b): "[A] claim.., for damages arising
from the... sale of [a security of the debtor] ... shall be
subordinated .. .,2 Thus, if a shareholder sells shares back to the
corporation at a fraudulently depressed price, the fraud claim
arising from the sale will be subordinated.
As already discussed, part of Slain and Kripke's justification for
subordinating fraud claims of purchases is that the purchaser
assumes the risk (i.e., the low seniority) associated with the security
being bought.24 This reasoning, however, is reversed in the case of
salesY The sellers of the stock no longer desire the risk and the low
priority associated with the security. Moreover, subordination of
claims that arise in connection with stock repurchase also dilutes the
deterrence of fraud if § 510(b) is read literally and the sellers' fraud
claims are not given seniority to common stock claims. Thus, for
sellers' claims, not only do the arguments of Slain and Kripke not
apply, but also the text of the Code, if it were interpreted literally,
would reduce deterrence against fraud.
Having identified these two errors in the literal application of
§ 510(b), it is important to note that they do not often arise in
practice. The principal errors, which have not yet been addressed,
regard how § 510(b) eliminates deterrence against fraud during
insolvency of the corporation, while it remains outside of
bankruptcy.
IV. FRAUD INCENTIVES DURING INSOLVENCY
Section 510 (b) eliminates deterrence against securities fraud in
two settings in which the corporation is balance-sheet insolvent (i.e.,
has more debt than assets). In combination with the fact that
during insolvency directors' fiduciary obligations shift in favor of
creditors, a lack of deterrence and the existence of some gain from
the fraud create a virtual fiduciary obligation upon the board of
directors to defraud in the two following situations: (1) the board of
" 11U.S.C.§510(b) (1994).
" See Slain & Kripke, supra note 6, at 286-88.
' A court recognized that the logic of § 510(b) does not apply to sales to the
corporation. See Nugent v. American Broadcasting System, Inc. (In re Betacom, Inc.) 225 B.R. 703
(Bankr. D. Az. 1998), where the debtor used § 510(b) in an attempt to subordinate the fraud
claims of ex-shareholders who sold their stock. The court interpreted § 510(b) narrowly so
that it would not apply to that transaction.
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an insolvent corporation is effectively obligated to defraud buyers of
the securities that are at that time the claimants to the firm's
residual value; and (2) the board of an insolvent parent is effectively
obligated to defraud buyers of their subsidiaries' stock. The
following discussion analyzes these two oddities.
A. The Incentive to Defraud Buyers of Debt Securities
Claiming the Residual
Changes in the value of solvent firms accrue to shareholders
because their claims are the most junior. Thus, they have the
expected incentives to avoid the liability on which the tort system
relies to deter fraud. Insolvency changes this picture. When the
value of the business or its assets falls below its total liabilities,
changes in the value of the firm accrue to the next most junior class
of claimants. Shareholders are out of the money in that they receive
no distribution in a hypothetical, instantaneous liquidation. This
would create a major concern, not only for the tort system, but also
for every decision that the board of directors makes. To resolve this
distortion, the fiduciary duties of the board of directors change in
the event of insolvency.
After the corporation becomes insolvent, the board's fiduciary
duties shift to the creditors."6  This mitigates the distorted
decisionmaking caused by insolvency. Under these changed
conditions, the board will not only make proper managerial
decisions, but their incentive to avoid tort liability is also largely
restored. In cases in which the board's duty is transferred to
subordinated creditors, the restoration of the incentive to avoid
additional liability is complete because any tort liability would be
senior to them. A dollar more of debt to general creditors leaves a
dollar less of firm value available for the subordinated creditors.
Even when the board's obligations are to general creditors, unless
See, e.g., In rePNP Holdings Corp., No. 96-35835, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 5481 (9th Cir.
Mar. 18, 1998); FDIC v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976-77 (4th Cir. 1982); Davis v. Woolf,
147 F.2d 629, 633 (4th Cir. 1945); In reWestern World Funding, 52 B.R. 762, 763 (Bankr. D.
Nev. 1985). Support is also offered in Alexander v. Hillman, in which directors are treated as
"trustees for creditors and shareholders." 296 U.S. 222, 240 (1935). Whether shareholders
are indeed not recipients of a duty after insolvency is less clear than it should be. See generally
Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors' Duty to
Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485 (1993); David Arthur Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of
Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REv. 461 (1992).
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the firm is very deeply insolvent, the board's incentives approximate
the incentives of solvent firms. Take the example of a corporate
liquidation in which creditors expect to receive ninety cents on the
dollar for their claims of $10 million. An additional $1 million
liability that results from a securities fraud claim will produce $11
million of claims running against $9 million of assets, for an 82%
distribution. The claim reduced the value of creditors' ultimate
distribution from $9 million to $8.2 million, indicating that the $1
million liability costs the creditors $800,000. While some reduction
in deterrence occurs, the fundamental incentive to avoid liability is
still firmly in place. Deeply insolvent corporations would face
significantly less deterrence, but they are unlikely to remain outside
bankruptcy. Once inside bankruptcy, tort claims receive
administrative expense priority, making them senior to the
unsecured creditors and restoring deterrence. Indeed, the
Supreme Court opinion that elevated tort claims to administrative
expense priority alludes to the need for deterrence.2 ' Thus, in every
state along this path of deterioration of corporate wealth,
deterrence remains in force. This would not be true, however, if the
tort claims were to be subordinated to the class in whose benefit
corporate decisions are made. Despite the efforts to avoid such
situations, § 510(b) creates two situations in which deterrence is
diminished.
An example easily illustrates how deterrence disappears with
subordination. Suppose a misrepresentation has a beneficial effect
on the corporation and increases its value by $10 million, but, given
the trading volume in its stock, it also creates securities fraud
liability to the class of shareholders who trade during the period
that the misrepresentation distorts its stock price. For example, the
parent might state that it is close to getting approval for a new drug
in the hope that other companies delay research into this type of
therapy so that the drug it is developing is the first on the market.
See Reading v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471, 483 (1968) ("[I]f a receiver or debtor in
possession is to be encouraged to obtain insurance in adequate amounts, the claims against
which insurance is obtained should be potentially payable in full."). The incentives to obtain
insurance against liability are directly related to the deterrence that the liability creates. The
terms of the insurance contract will typically require appropriate care and efforts to prevent
the liability. Similar deterrence incentives may be built into the pricing of insurance, with
premiums increasing as care decreases. Finally, the level of care that will be chosen by one
who self-insures (i.e., who chooses to bear the risk of liability) will only be appropriate if the
liability is felt to its full extent.
[Vol. 16
Strange Subordinations
The false impression pushes up the stock price by $5 during the
three months it takes to determine the falsity of the statement.
During this period three million securities change hands, creating a
$15 million liability. A solvent parent corporation will be deterred
from making the misrepresentation. Let us consider, however, a
deeply insolvent parent.
Because the parent is insolvent, the value of its stock is nominal,
and because the $10 million advantage would not render the
corporation solvent, the misrepresentation does not influence its
stock value. It does influence the value of its debt. Suppose the
corporation has $80 million of value (in assets or as a going-
concern), $25 million of secured and $25 million of ordinary debt,
both of which trade at par. The corporation also has $50 million of
subordinated notes, which, due to the shortage of assets, have a
market capitalization of $30 million (60% of par). The misrepre-
sentation increases the value of the corporate business by $10
million. Therefore, the value of the notes may increase from $30 to
$40 million, depending on the impact of the securities fraud liability
to those who buy the notes after the misrepresentation and before
the truth is determined.
To determine how the securities fraud liability will influence
the incentives of the noteholders, we must examine the seniority of
the securities fraud claimants, who in this case are the note buyers.
Section 510(b) unambiguously subordinates the claims from the
purchase of subordinated notes to make them immediately junior to
noteholders' underlying claims." Thus, the liability has no effect.
Only if the corporation's value increases by $10 million more would
the defrauded buyers see any distribution in liquidation. Effectively,
the subordination of the defrauded note-buyers' claims makes the
fraud that the noteholders commit not come at their expense.
Since the corporate directors owe their fiduciary duties to the
noteholders during insolvency, the distorted incentives create an
incentive on their part to defraud.
B. The Incentive to Defraud Buyers of Subsidiaries' Stock
The last subordination that this Article tackles is the
subordination of fraud claims held by a subsidiary's shareholders,
which § 510(b) treats identically to the fraud claims of shareholders
- 11 U.S.C. § 510(b) (1994).
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of the parent. Thus, the claims held by shareholders of a subsidiary
are given a seniority equal to that of common stockholders,
although in practice that means they are placed immediately senior
to those of common stockholders. If the parent is insolvent, this
subordination replicates the above effect and produces an incentive
to defraud the shareholders of the subsidiary. However, some
erosion of the deterrent effect of securities fraud is achieved in this
instance even before insolvency. Before turning to their
subordination, let us start by studying the seniority of claims against
subsidiaries.
Ordinary claims against the subsidiary have the seniority of
unsecured debt. Thus, if the subsidiary were to fail, the first to be
satisfied would be its secured creditors, followed by its unsecured
creditors and any deficiency claims that the secured creditors may
have. In liquidation, assets would be sold to satisfy their claims. Any
residual value would be distributed next to any creditors who may
have agreed to be subordinated, then to any preferred shareholders,
and, finally, the remainder will be released to the shareholders, who
include the parent corporation. If the parent were to fail as well,
what it received by virtue of its ownership of common stock of the
subsidiary would be distributed using the same principles. First, if
the parent pledged its stock in the subsidiary as collateral securing a
debt, assets would be distributed to those secured creditors, then to
unsecured creditors, subordinated creditors, preferred
shareholders, and, finally, to common shareholders of the parent.
Naturally, the treatment of a fraud claim is not different.
Consider a fraud or rescission claim arising from a transaction in
the subsidiary's ordinary course of business. Ignoring the complex
question of conflicts with secured claims, 9 the fraud claim against
the subsidiary would rank ahead of preferred and common stock
claims of shareholders of the subsidiary, ahead of secured and
general creditors of the parent, and ahead of preferred and
common shareholders of the parent.
' Consider, for example, a fraudulent sale of an item from the subsidiary's inventory.
The fraud claim of the buyer might be subordinate to a secured creditor with a perfected
security interest in the item or in the revolving collateral, here the inventory, and its proceeds.
But a rescission claim may also be protected by a constructive trust, in which case the proceeds
that the subsidiary received would not become part of its estate and the buyer's claim may be




The priority of fraud claims in the case of a sale of substantially
all the assets of the subsidiary is no different from the above analysis
of a claim based on a transaction in the ordinary course of the
subsidiary's business. The buyer's claim will have the same high
seniority. The only difference lies in the fact that often the
subsidiary will no longer serve a business purpose and, therefore,
the parent may proceed to liquidate it. The issue then becomes the
priority of the fraud claim in a setting where the subsidiary is being
liquidated. Will the liquidation reduce the priority of the fraud
claim?
In principle, the liquidation will not reduce the priority of
claims against the subsidiary. If the subsidiary has notice of the
possible fraud claim, the subsidiary must account for the claim
before making any distribution. If the subsidiary makes the
distribution without accounting for the claim, fraudulent transfer
law will invalidate the transfer. Fraudulent transfer law has two
sources, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act and, in bankruptcy, §
548 of the Code. In both cases, transfers without consideration
(including every dividend) that render the debtor insolvent are
fraudulent and can be reversed. 'Corporate law imposes liability on
directors that distribute excessive dividends." Even if the debtor
subsidiary is unaware of the potential liability at the time of the
liquidating dividend, the fraud claimant can, with two other credi-
tors, file an involuntary bankruptcy petition up to a year later and
recover the transfer under § 548; the reach-back period extends one
year because the liquidating dividend payment to the parent is a
transfer for the benefit of an insider. Only after satisfying the fraud
claimant will the parent be able to distribute the assets of the
subsidiary. Only from this distribution will the parent's creditors be
satisfied, from secured creditors, through unsecured and
subordinated creditors and preferred shareholders, all the way to
equityholders.
In sum, even claims that were unknown to the subsidiary or the
parent receive ample protection from liquidation. The claimant
may have up to four years to recover the transfer under the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act.3' State corporate law also allows creditors
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 174 (1998); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 719 (McKinney
1999); REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACr § 8.33. The directors will often have an action for
contribution against the shareholders. SeeDEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 174(c).
" UNIF. FRAUDULENTTRANSFERAGr§ 9 (1994).
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to recover distributions to the shareholders of more than surplus or
profits from the directors with an even longer limitations period.32
This protection is conclusive. A parent cannot cause the
subordination of a fraud claim against a subsidiary.
By contrast, consider the straight application of § 510(b) to a
sale of a controlling block of the subsidiary's stock. A stock sale is
the equivalent transaction to a sale of substantially all the assets
because, in essence, the buyer gets the same control over an
enterprise, a productive collection of the same assets and
relations-the same assets that would be sold in the sale of
substantially all assets.
If the buyer has a fraud claim, the fraud claim will be against
the parent company, which is the seller of the stock. One may think
that this implies a substantive difference in the transactions since
the buyer has voluntarily given up some seniority to drop from a
potential creditor of the subsidiary (senior to subsidiary preferred
and common equity, and to all parent creditors) to a potential
creditor of the parent. This is deceptive because the purchase price
paid for the stock will reflect the change in seniority. Consider, for
example, that the stock of the subsidiary secured some indebtedness
of the parent. That obligation will usually be addressed before the
transfer so that the buyer receives unencumbered shares. If not,
then the buyer will adjust the price for buying encumbered assets,
becoming, in effect, a co-debtor. Similarly, the buyer will adjust the
price for the debt load of the subsidiary and any preferred stock that
is, in this case, senior to the buyer's equity claim. The parties
compensate for all changes in seniority. Section 510(b) overrules
that arrangement, but only partially, so as to reduce the fraud claim
to the priority of the parent's common stock. The rest of the
contractual relation remains unchanged, and a claim for
nonperformance, for example, will be a regular unsecured claim
against the parent.
One may think that the buyer of a controlling block of a
subsidiary should be able to argue that this purchase is not a
purchase of stock but a purchase of a business. Indeed, in one of the
" Delaware law, for example, holds directors liable for illegal dividend distributions for
six years. SeeDEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 174(a) ("[T]he directors ... shall bejointly and severally
liable, at any time within 6 years of paying such unlawful dividend.., to the corporation, and
to its creditors... "). Directors then have an action against the shareholders for contribution.
See, e.g., id. § 174(c).
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two cases to have dealt with this issue the purchaser unsuccessfully
made this very argumnent. 3 Securities regulations define stock as a
security.M Several exceptions have developed when the context of
the transaction requires a sale of stock not to be treated as a sale of
securities. The archetypal example involves the sale of shares in a
co-op, which entities the buyer to occupy a specific unit in the
building with associated rights and obligations." A similar
exception had been recognized by many circuits (the "sale of
business doctrine") to exclude from the definition of a security the
sale of control in an enterprise." The Supreme Court intervened
and eliminated the sale-of-business doctrine.37 As a result, the fraud
claimant in CLC of America, Inc. v. Lake Shore Equip. Distribs., Inc. (In
re Wisconsin Barge Line, Inc.) had no argument.' The purchase of
the subsidiary was the purchase of stock. The superficial reading of
§ 510(b) had to apply, and the claim was subordinated.
Perhaps it is fortunate that the sale-of-business doctrine was not
resurrected for the purpose of § 510(b) because there is no
analytical difference between a fraud claim by a buyer of control
and the buyer of a single share of a subsidiary. Neither offers a
reason to be subordinated to the parent's creditors. The subordina-
tion of fraud claims seeks to return the priority of sellers of common
stock to buyers of common stock, in part because they accept the
risks inherent in common stock. The buyers of the subsidiary's
stock, however, do not accept any of the risks associated with
holding stock of its parent. Moreover, the subordination below
parent creditors eliminates the deterrence on the parent from
incurring securities fraud liability when the parent is insolvent.
Because the subordination of the fraud claims of subsidiary
shareholders happens with regard to both subsidiary and parent
" See CLC of America, Inc. v. Lake Shore Equip. Distribs., Inc. (In re Wisconsin Barge
Line, Inc.), 76 B.R. 142 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1987).
" Section 2(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 defines a security to mean "any note [or]
stock." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (1999).
' See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
" The Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal had sided with the
proposition that a sale of a controlling block of stock was not a sale of a security for the
purpose of the Securities Acts. The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits took the
opposite position. See RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND
MATERIALS 299 n.2 (7th ed. 1992).




creditors, there are two deterrent effects at issue: that of the parent
and that of the subsidiary. Since § 510(b) would only subordinate
the subsidiary's fraud claims to those of the parent creditors' if the
parent is in bankruptcy, but not if the subsidiary alone is in
bankruptcy, the obvious object of study must regard the insolvency
of the parent. An additional concern may arise, however, if a
solvent parent files for bankruptcy to take advantage of § 510(b).
The two issues will be discussed in turn.
As with any other tort, the parent who is in a position to
commit securities fraud through a misrepresentation weighs the
consequences of making a false statement about the subsidiary that
would result in an immediate benefit to the parent. If the parent
were solvent, any tort liability of the parent would reduce the
amount shareholders would receive in liquidation and the full
incentive to avoid it would exist. If the parent were insolvent,
however, the claimants of its last dollar of value would no longer
belong to the shareholders but to some more senior class. With
insolvency comes a shift in the fiduciary obligations of the board.39
When the board makes its determination whether to defraud, the
board must act for the interest of the current holders of the
residual. Since § 510(b) subordinates subsidiary shareholders'
fraud claims to all the creditors of the parent, the board realizes that
the creditors who are the residual claimants will receive all the
benefits of the fraud without suffering the liability that follows .
Hence, the board of directors effectively has the incentive to
defraud buyers of the subsidiary's stock.
The case of a voluntary filing to take advantage of the change in
priorities of § 510(b) can be motivated by any one of several
scenarios. A particularly pernicious one may be as follows. The
parent and the subsidiary are both solvent but the subsidiary is a
larger enterprise than the parent. The person controlling the
parent owns a smaller fraction of its stock than of the subsidiary.
The controller induces a false statement bestowing a benefit on the
subsidiary that would normally have been deterred because of the
solvency of both. The two corporations file for bankruptcy and
invoke § 510(b). Because of the subordination, the controller will
receive in full the larger fraction of the subsidiary's inflated value
unimpeded by the fraud liability because it is subordinated. The
" See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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parent will receive its share and will distribute it to its shareholders
after paying the fraud claimants. In this setting, the fraud
deterrence has been eroded even though both corporations are
solvent. An example will clarify.
The controller, J.J. Owner, holds 20% of Parent and 35% of
Sub. Parent owns 50% of Sub. The value of Sub's business is $100
million, which after debts of $50 million leaves $50 million for its
shareholders. Parent's business is worth $15 million, which after
addition of its position in Sub, worth $25 million, and debts of $20
million, leaves $20 million equity for its shareholders. Owner's
personal wealth, including the $4 million position in Parent and the
$17.5 million in Sub, totals $21.5 million. The false statement
increases the value of Sub by $10 million and creates $11 million of
securities fraud liability. When the liability appears, Parent and Sub
make voluntary bankruptcy filings. A buyer for Sub's business offers
its full value of $110 million, of which the shareholders, after paying
its debts, receive $60 million, $24.5 million accruing directly to
Owner and $30 million accruing to Parent. Parent distributes its
value, $15 million in its business and $30 million in the Sub, after
paying its preexisting debts of $20 million and the securities fraud
liability of $11 million, leaving $14 million for distribution, of which
Owner receives $2.8 million. Owner's position after all this is $24.5
million from Sub plus $2.8 million from Parent, or $27.3 million.
The fraud, because of the subordination of the fraud claim,
improved Owner's position by about $7 million. Without
subordination of the fraud claim, Owner's 35% of Sub would be
35% of the $49 million of equity remaining after paying the
securities fraud claim, namely $17.15 million, and Owner's 20% of
Parent, which would hold 50% of the $49 million and the $15
million business of Parent minus Parent's debts of $20 million,
would end up being $3.9 million. Owner would be limited to $21.05
million, so that instead of profiting by the fraud, Owner loses
$450,000. These $450,000 are exactly Owner's share of the $1
million net loss-gain of $10 million minus liability of $11
million-that the fraud inflicts: 35% of $1 million (through Sub)
plus 20% of 50% of $1 million (through Parent).
Other distortions that the subordination of securities fraud
claims may produce involve the decisions that subsidiary directors
make regarding fraudulent statements when they know part of the
statement's impact may lead to a bankruptcy filing by the parent,
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which will trigger the subordination of liability for their statement
and relieve their shareholders from its burden.
A further example may have the subsidiary making business
decisions that potentially give the opportunity for the subsidiary to
take advantage of the subordination of its fraud debts to the
ordinary debts of its parent. Thus, when comparing two projects, a
subsidiary might choose the slightly inferior one if the confidence of
the parent's lenders in the parent's solvency could be undermined
by a fraudulent statement. If this state materialized, the subsidiary
would be able to commit securities fraud at no cost to its
shareholders. A further complication would have the subsidiary
commit securities fraud against its own shareholders, while the
parent would still be solvent. The fraud is attractive, not because
the subsidiary can avoid the liability every time, but because it may
be avoided with sufficient likelihood (in case the parent files for
bankruptcy) that the fraud is worthwhile from the perspective of
subsidiary shareholders. Further distortions may regard the appeal
of bankruptcy itself. Securities fraud claims against an insolvent
subsidiary produce a disincentive disfavoring a bankruptcy by the
parent. If the claims are settled in a bankruptcy of the subsidiary
alone, they will not be paid in full, but if the parent files for
bankruptcy before that, its shareholders will feel the full impact of
the subordinated liability.
V. SUPERIOR SUBORDINATION: TOWARD A REPAIRED § 510(b)
Doubtless, the details of the subordination that § 510(b)
commands are wrong, but what is the optimal shape that
subordination should take? The premise of § 510(b) that fraud and
rescission claims be subordinated should be accepted. °  The
, One need not believe that securities fraud liability is excessive or random (i.e., that
security fraud rules over-deter or provide ineffective deterrence) in order to accept the idea
that shareholders' fraud and rescission claims should be subordinated. Subordination is also
acceptable if firms are appropriately deterred both at the time of issuance as well as after
issuance, or ifjunior creditors cannot effectively police misrepresentations by their debtors.
Effective policing is highly unlikely from unsecured creditors who are trade creditors with
simple contracts or even involuntary creditors. If fraud and rescission claims were not
subordinated, they would take the priority of ordinary credit and reduce only fractionally the
distribution to unsecured creditors. Thus, even if unsecured creditors were in a position to
monitor securities fraud by their debtors, their incentive to do so is diluted by the fact that
they suffer only a fraction of the fraud's cost. Therefore, it is unlikely that changing the basic
structure of§ 510(b) can be justified.
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reparation of the four errors can then be implemented either by
means of amending the statute, or by means of judicial
interpretation. Compared with other errors of the Code that have
been corrected by the judiciary, this interpretive correction may be
so straightfonvard that it might not even justify the usual Scalia
dissent.4 '
A. Fixing the Errors of Priority Equal to Common Stock and Subordination
of Claims from Resales
A statutory remedy of the first two problems, the excessive
subordination of shareholders' rescission claims and the
subordination of fraud claims of former shareholders who resold
their shares to the corporation, would be straightforward. The
language stating that shareholders' fraud claims receive priority
"equal to common stock" would be changed so they receive priority
"immediately senior to common stock" and instead of subordinating
claims from "purchases or sales," § 510(b) should command the
subordination of claims from purchases only.42
Courts, however, have already remedied these lesser errors of
§ 510(b). They clearly do not apply the excessive subordination
language, and although no dismissal of such an argument appears,
it is unlikely that courts would accept the argument that fraud
claims from resales by shareholders to the corporation should be
subordinated. Even if the express language of § 510(b) is
considered to impede the latter of these two interpretive
corrections, a different one is still available. The only possible
4 See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992). In Dewsnup, the Supreme Court
interpreted § 506(d), in contrast to a literal reading of the statute, which, when read in
context states that "to the extent that a lien secures a[n un]secured claim, such lien is void."
11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1999). The statutory language led some courts, in contrast to legislative
intent, to strip liens down to the value of the collateral at the time of the bankruptcy filing.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Dewsnup drew the ire of Justice Scalia, a well known literalist
interpreter. I&. at 429 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
4 Thus, if only these two corrections are made, a redlined version of § 510(b) would
read as follows:
For the purpose of distribution under this title, a claim arising from rescission of a
purchase or -sae of a security of the debtor or of an affiliate of the debtor, for
damages arising from the purchase oe-sale of such a security, or for reimbursement
or contribution allowed under section 502 on account of such a claim, shall be
subordinated to all claims or interests that are senior to or equal the claim or
interest represented by such security, except that if such security is common stock,
such claim has thte-same priority es immediately senior to common stock.
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overreaching use of securities fraud by shareholders involves those
situations when they have the firm distribute more of its value than
they legitimately can enjoy by means of a securities fraud claim.' s
Courts can use this example as a basis to understand that the
§ 510(b) subordination applies to claims from resales because the
claimants are still shareholders of the firm. From this and the fact
that fraud claims of purchasers are claims of active shareholders,
courts should derive that § 510(b) applies to claims of active
shareholders only. If the nexus between shareholder and
corporation has been broken by a complete resale to the firm, then
§ 510 (b) would not apply because when it refers to "shareholders" it
means "active shareholders." This interpretation would prevent a
wholesale transfer of value to shareholders by means of a concession
of securities fraud liability because any general scheme to transfer
excessive value to shareholders would involve a tender offer for less
than all shares in which the vast majority of shareholders would
participate."
4' See infta note 44.
" The basis of the transaction would be an attempt on the part of shareholders to
circumvent the priority of creditors by repurchasing shares instead of declaring dividends.
The intended transaction would be a distribution of more than the amount of unencumbered
equity. For example, assume that a corporation has assets of $5 million and liabilities of $4
million. Additionally, assume that the corporation has one million shares outstanding, each
commanding the appropriate price of $1. The corporation might be tempted to take a
secured loan of $1.5 million and institute a self-tender for 500,000 shares at a price of $3 per
share. At the completion of the self-tender the corporation would have managed to distribute
to the shareholders $500,000 more than it could distribute as dividends. Note that all the
shareholders should tender, the offer will be prorated according to the Securities Exchange
Act, see 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1998); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1999), and as a result all the
shareholders would have the opportunity to participate equally in the distribution.
Since such transactions cannot be implemented because of fraudulent transfer and
corporate law, in which would undo the transfers to the shareholders and impose liability on
the corporate directors, see supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text, an alternative worth
exploring is whether the corporation could give its shareholders fraud claims instead of cash.
In the absence of § 510(b), these fraud claims would receive the priority of unsecured debt
and allow shareholders to receive more than they would otherwise. Consider the following
transaction. The same corporation repurchases one-half of its shares at the correct price of
$1. The corporation achieves this end by distributing $500,000 of its unencumbered equity,
leaving it with $4.5 million of assets and $4 million of unsecured debt. The corporation
subsequently (falsely) concedes that it manipulated the price of its stock, which should be at
$3, giving the selling shareholders a fraud claim of $2 for each of the 500,000 repurchased
shares, or $1 million. Now the corporation is insolvent with $5 million of debt and $4.5
million of assets, liquidates, and pays ninety cents on each unsecured claimant's dollar. The
shareholders receive 90% of their $1 million fraud claim. Added to their $500,000 tender
offer proceeds, the shareholders have managed to extract $400,000 from the corporation that
they could not otherwise. If their claim is subordinated, this paradox disappears.
Strange Subordinations
As the first two (lesser) errors of § 510(b) can be corrected by
either a legislative amendment or interpretation by the courts, so
can the other two errors, regarding fraud claims of securities other
than common stock (hereinafter "debt securities," although they
include preferred stock), and claims of subsidiary common
stockholders. Both, however, are complex errors that can be solved
in numerous different ways.
B. The Subordination of Fraud Claims of Debt Securities
In the case of claims of debt securities, the remedy must be
chosen from among several candidates. Should fraud claims of all
debt securities be immediately senior to the claims of the class or
should that priority apply only to claims arising from the purchase
of only those debt securities which at that time have a claim to the
residual? This is a valid question because, unlike the distortion in
deterrence and decisionmaking from the error regarding subsidiary
stock, the error regarding debt securities does not distort decisions
in anticipation of bankruptcy or insolvency. Before insolvency the
corporation is operated for the shareholders' benefit. The error
regarding fraud claims of senior securityholders influences only the
wealth calculus of senior securityholders. Thus, even if the
shareholders anticipate insolvency and have the ability of senior
security holders to commit securities fraud with impunity, they
cannot take advantage. Thus, the error regarding the
subordination of senior securityholders' fraud claims does not lead
to an anticipatory distortion of decisions or of deterrence.
Therefore, it need not receive a general correction. The regime
that § 510(b) establishes can apply to all fraud claims, as long as it
does not apply to those that arise while the error eliminates their
deterrence. Thus, both a complete correction that makes fraud
claims of all classes' immediately senior to the claims of each class
That § 510(b) subordinates fraud claims from resales motivated by preventing the above
transaction is a prime example of an extreme reaction to the excessive fear of securities fraud
liability exemplified in Slain & Kripke. The corporation abused judicial process in creating
nonexistent liability. The transfer to the shareholders in the context of the tender offer is
avoidable with a one-year reach-back period in cases of purchasers from directors, officers,
and controlling persons and their relatives (insiders as defined by § 101(31) which also
includes partnerships of the debtor and their general partners). The admission of fraud itself
constitutes an avoidable transfer that few courts would have difficulty identifying. There is
little danger of such a transaction succeeding.
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and a partial remedy makes the fraud claims that arose while that
class claimed the residual immediately senior to a particular class's
claims (i.e., the class was the last in-the-money class or, in other
words, the last class that would receive any distribution in a
liquidation), should be acceptable. At issue is to establish how each
can be implemented and what concerns argue in favor of each.
A legislative correction could easily implement the complete
correction by amending § 510(b) so that all fraud claims become
immediately senior to the claims of their own class.45 A partial
correction would be more difficult because it would have to leave
the existing subordination regime in place except for fraud claims
arising at a time when the class of the security that was purchased
would be the most junior class that would receive any distribution in
a liquidation. A second exception would have to be appended to
§ 510(b), excluding from subordination under § 510(b) fraud
claims arising while the same class of claims would have been the
most junior claimant receiving any distribution in a liquidation.
Those claims would be subordinated to become immediately senior
to the claims of the same class.46 An example will illustrate the effect
of this kind of subordination.
' Such a legislative arrangement would provide an additional, but simply aesthetic
benefit by shortening § 510(b). Since both the fraud claims of holders of common stock as
well as the fraud claims of other security holders would be immediately senior to the
underlying claims of their own class, § 510(b) could state one subordination rule rather than
the current two. The redlined version reads as follows:
For the purpose of distribution under this title, a claim arising from rescission of a
purchase or-side of a security of the debtor or of an affiliate of the debtor, for
damages arising from the purchase or-sale of such a security, or for reimbursement
or contribution allowed under section 502 on account of such a claim, shall be
subordinated to all claims or interests that are senior to or-eqtteA the claim or
interest represented by such security, emcept that if s ctetit is ...... "
stieh elait" has the am priority a -fflA 0Ap-
'5 Contrary to the previous correction, this one would produce a lengthier provision.
The redlined text here also cures the next error by not subordinating claims from purchases
of subsidiaries' stock. The redlined text also carries over the deletion of the "or sale" language
and the cure of the excessive subordination of fraud claims by holders of common stock. It
would be as follows:
For the purpose of distribution under this tile, a claim arising from rescission of a
purchase e-satle of a security of the debtor or of an affiliate of the debtor, for
damages arising from the purchase orsale of such a security, or for reimbursement
or contribution allowed under section 502 on account of such a claim, shall be
subordinated to all claims or interests that are senior to or equal the claim or
interest represented by such security, except that (i) if such security is common
stock, such claim has the ean p. x:yt a shall be subordinated only to all claims or
interests that are senior to common stock and (ii) if such claim arose while the class of
Strange Subordinations
Manufacturing, Inc. has liabilities in the amount of $5 million
payable to bondholders, $5 million payable to subordinated
noteholders, and $5 million payable to preferred shareholders. As
its prospects fade, the total value of the firm drops below $15
million on February 1, then below $10 million on March 1, and
when Manufacturing files for bankruptcy on March 15, it is worth $7
million and is sold for that amount. The board of Manufacturing
has made two misrepresentations, one on February 10, and one on
March 10. Each misrepresentation influenced the price of the
bonds and the notes and caused liability of $1 million to each set of
claimants. Consider when each class of claims had a claim to the
residual. Changes in value of the firm accrued to the holders of the
common stock before February 1, to the preferred stockholders
between February 1 and March 1, and to the unsecured noteholders
after that. The February 10th misrepresentation, although made
during insolvency, was not made while the noteholders were the
residual claimants. The board of Manufacturing at that time owed
its fiduciary duties to the preferred stockholders, who had
everything to lose from securities fraud liability to the noteholders.
Even if that claim would be subordinate to the noteholders'
underlying claim, it would still be senior to the claim of preferred
shareholders. Therefore, the deterrent effect of securities liability
was in effect at the time the fraud was committed. The March 10
misrepresentation, however, is made while noteholders claim the
residual. The board of Manufacturing owed its fiduciary duties at
that time to noteholders. If § 510(b) is followed and noteholders'
fraud claims are subordinated to the ordinary claims of the
noteholders, there would be no deterrence. At the time the misre-
presentation is made to purchasers of notes, it is known that they
will not be able to collect on their fraud claims because § 510(b)
makes them junior to noteholders' ordinary claims. For the
noteholders and the board that serves their interests to be deterred,
fraud claims arising while they claim the residual must be senior to
them. By contrast, the seniority of the claim of the defrauded
bondholders need not change. Even though it is junior to
bondholders' ordinary claims, the decisionmakers on February 10
and March 10 are deterred from incurring that additional liability.
claims or interests represented by such security were the most junior class that would receive any
value in a chapter 7 liquidation, then such claim shall be subordinated only to all claims or
interests that are senior to the claim or interest represented by such security.
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Thus the incomplete remedy of not subordinating only those fraud
claims that were not deterred cures the problem with a minimal
interference in the existing mechanics of § 510(b).
This partial correction, which would only change the treatment
by § 510(b) of those fraud claims that arise while their class claims
the residual, will have the additional advantage of appeasing those
who distrust the system of securities fraud liability. Because the
typical securities fraud claim would still be subordinate to the
underlying claims of the same class, it would not have been
rendered more appealing to the contingent-fee lawyers who usually
prosecute securities fraud class actions and are vilified by those who
believe that most securities fraud suits are brought for their
nuisance value rather than their merits." Finally, the reduction of
securities fraud suits against failed companies that § 510(b) induces
by its excessive subordination can be considered desirable even if
securities fraud litigation is generally meritorious. The premise for
this argument is that once the corporation is in bankruptcy, the
amount that the equityholders will receive does not depend on the
amount of unsatisfied unsecured claims. The equity may get
nothing or it may get the constant amount that its bargaining
advantage in chapter 11 allows it to extract. Regardless, contingent
upon bankruptcy having occurred, additional unsecured claims
have no effect on the welfare of equityholders. Consequently, the
possibility of securities fraud liability does not deter the
equityholders from fraud and since the liability serves no social
function, the litigation to determine it is a waste that is better
avoided. An example will explain.
The example that illustrates the ineffectiveness of securities
fraud liability to deter because of its irrelevance in bankruptcy
would start by positing that equity claimants receive the same
amount regardless of the size of unsatisfied unsecured claims. In the
case of the chapter 11 filing of our paradigmatic Manufacturing,
Inc., suppose that the equity receives nothing due to its bargaining
power. Consider the deterrence created by the fear of securities
47 While this concern likely was behind the Slain and Kripke drive toward subordination,
see supra note 6, as well as its success, see supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text, it is still the
subject of concern, see, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the
Federal Securities Acts: The Commission's Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 963 (1994); Joseph A.
Grundfest, We Must Never Forget That It Is an Inkblot We Are Expounding Section 10(b) as a
Rorschach Test, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 61 (1995).
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fraud liability when Manufacturing is still solvent with equity of $10
million, but faces a 25% probability of insolvency in six months.
The management of Manufacturing considers the ramifications of a
misrepresentation that would produce $3 million of gain, but $4
million of liability, and will reduce the probability of insolvency to
15%. The calculus of deterrence will be as follows.
Without making the misrepresentation, equity will get $10
million the 75% of the time that Manufacturing remains solvent and
nothing the 25% on the time that Manufacturing is in chapter 11,
for an expected value of $7.5 million (.75 x 10 + .25 x 0). With the
misrepresentation, equity receives $9 million 85% of the time but
again nothing in the 15% of the time they are in chapter 11, for a
greater expected value of $7.65 million (.85 x 9 + .15 x 0). The
paradox is not that the calculus of deterrence favors fraud; it may
not. The fact that the amount the equity receives in insolvency does
not depend on the fraud takes insolvency out of the equity's
deterrence decision. This becomes apparent if we examine the
opposite case, when equity's welfare in bankruptcy does depend on
the absence of the securities fraud claim. Imagine that the $4
million of securities fraud liability prevents the equity from receiving
$1 million it otherwise would have been able to extract because of
its bargaining advantage in chapter 11. Now the calculus of
deterrence changes. Without the fraud, equity receives $10 million
the 75% of the time Manufacturing is solvent and $1 million the
25% of the time it is in chapter 11, for a value of 7.8 (.75 x 10 + .25 x
1). With the misrepresentation, equityholders receive the same $9
million the 85% of the time the corporation is solvent, and again
nothing in bankruptcy, for the same value of $7.65 million (.85 x 9 +
.15 x 0). Now that the equity's welfare in bankruptcy depends on
fraud liability, the existence of the fraud liability in bankruptcy
becomes relevant for deterrence before the bankruptcy.
Those who believe equity's welfare in bankruptcy does not
depend on the amount of unsatisfied unsecured claims should favor
reducing the disputes about unsecured claims, and to the extent
subordination does that by reducing the incentive to prosecute
securities fraud class actions, they would be in favor of maintaining
the subordination of fraud claims to below the claims of the same
class that § 510(b) mandates and that the partial repair maintains.
Those who believe equity's welfare in bankruptcy does depend on
the amount on unsecured claims would believe that determining
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fraud liability in bankruptcy plays a role in deterrence outside
bankruptcy. Therefore, they would consider the prosecution of
fraud claims useful and measures that reduce the likelihood of
securities fraud class actions, such as the subordination of fraud
claims to the claims of the same class, undesirable. They would
favor the complete correction. Without more study of this matter,
this dispute cannot be resolved here. What is clear is that the partial
correction is definitely justified, while the complete correction may
not be.
The complete correction is not forthcoming from interpreta-
tion alone. Courts can, however, follow a line of interpretation that
allows them to approach the partial correction of the error of
eliminating deterrence against defrauding buyers of debt securities
during insolvency. The last two errors of § 510(b) show that it was
not drafted so as to apply to frauds that occur during insolvency.
Once the corporation is insolvent, following the letter of § 510(b)
would create incentives to defraud buyers of debt securities and
buyers of common stock of subsidiaries. Since Congress cannot
have intended this result, it is apparent that § 510(b) was intended
only to apply in the instances in which it does not eliminate
deterrence. Therefore, it does not apply in the cases of fraud claims
of nonequity security buyers that arose at the time that particular
class was the most junior in-the-money class.4" In those cases, pre-
Code law will apply. If the res of a constructive trust can be traced,
the fraud claimant would receive priority, otherwise the fraud
claimant would be treated as an ordinary creditor, unless the
creditor gives grounds for subordination, in which case it will be
subordinated as the equities of the particular case dictate per §
510(c).
C. The Subordination of Fraud Claims of Subsidiary Shareholders
Unlike the subordination of fraud claims of debt securities, the
subordination of the fraud claims of subsidiary shareholders does
distort decisions in anticipation of insolvency. Fraud committed
before insolvency upon subsidiary shareholders will appear more
"' Indeed, the against-the-text-of-§ 510(b) practice of not subordinating fraud claims of
equity buyers should be seen as part of this interpretation. Fraud claims of buyers of any
security do not fall under § 510(b) if they arise when that class claims the residual because this
would eliminate deterrence of fraud.
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attractive if insolvency of the parent is likely in the future,
whereupon the fraud claims would be subordinated to extinction.
Because of this anticipatory distortion in deterrence, the correction
here must be complete.
The error about the subordination of subsidiary shareholders'
fraud claims can be corrected in a manner that has the same
consequences, regardless of whether the correction is implemented
legislatively or through interpretation. A legislative correction
would simply strike the text "or of an affiliate of the debtor" from
§ 510(b). 9 An interpretive correction would be founded on the
notion that the subordination § 510(b) imposes generally is
subordination to a level immediately junior to the security's
underlying claims. When this general principle is applied to fraud
claims arising from the purchase of common stock of subsidiaries,
the reference that these claims must be subordinated to the level of
common stock means not common stock of the parent, but
common stock of the subsidiary. Since common stock claims of the
subsidiary are senior to all claims of parent creditors, this level of
subordination will remedy the error.
VI. CONCLUSION: PROBLEMS LATENT AND ACUTE; REPAIRS
INTERPRETIVE AND LEGISLATIVE, PARTIAL AND COMPLETE
The variety of errors that § 510(b) presents for correction allow
a look at a broad spectrum of types of problems that the Bankruptcy
Code may give rise to, as well as a broad spectrum of remedies. The
problems encountered ranged from the latent to the acute. Two
different types of latent errors were represented by the first two
errors discussed. The excessive subordination of common stock's
fraud claims is latent because courts ignore the text of the provision.
The false subordination of fraud claims from the resale of securities
to the corporation is latent because transactions giving rise to such
claims are unlikely to occur before bankruptcy when the corporate
prospects and the liquidity of the corporate coffers are fading.
The correction of latent errors may seem pointless but its
function exceeds the correction of a rule that is not applied. The
against-the-text interpretation that courts apply to correct the error
of excessive subordination shows that the courts have the capacity to
adopt the interpretations necessary to correct the other errors as
" As in the redlined text supra at note 46.
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well. The correction of the false subordination of the fraud claims
from resales to the corporation removes a pointless impediment
that makes transactions involving stock buybacks by corporations
costlier and less attractive. The need to correct the acute errors, of
course, needs no justification.
That both legislative and interpretive corrections can achieve
largely the same purposes may be an idiosyncrasy of bankruptcy law
and of the interpretive latitude that has always been necessary to
reign in wily debtors and to produce equitable results with limited
rules. When evaluating the plausibility and the necessity of the
interpretive corrections, it must be kept in mind that legislative
attempts to fix § 510(b) have repeatedly failed and that recent
proposals about updating the Bankruptcy Code have been divisive
rather than consensus-building. Despite that legislative corrections
would lead with greater predictability to the intended result, they
are not particularly likely to be implemented. The unusual political
economy of amending the Code argues in favor of interpretive
corrections. The difficulty of producing the consensus necessary for
amending the Code also argues in favor of the partial corrections
compared to complete corrections when a choice exists and the
partial correction will suffice.
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